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Aviation and Emissions Trading in the 
European Union: Pie in the Sky or 
Compatible with International Law? 
Stephanie Switzer∗ 
In 2003, the then European Community1 adopted Directive 2003/87/EC, 
establishing a scheme for trading allowances of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.2 Directive 2003/87/EC mandated the establishment of an emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) within the European Community “to promote reductions 
of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
manner.”3 The preamble to Directive 2003/87/EC states that the establishment 
of such a scheme would contribute to the achievement of the European 
Community’s and its Member States’ commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.4 
In this regard, the Protocol is a mechanism enacted by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change5 to promote reductions in 
emissions associated with climate change. The Protocol entered into force in 
2005 and requires participating Annex 1 countries—in effect, developed 
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 1. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0001:0010:EN:PDF (European Community existed as a 
legal entity until the Treaty of Lisbon was entered into force); see also Consolidated Version of The 
Treaty on European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF [hereinafter The Treaty on 
European Union]. The Treaty of Lisbon, inter alia, amended the Treaty on European Union. Article 1 of 
the [current] Treaty on European Union directs that, “The Union shall replace and succeed the European 
Community . . . .” Id. 
 2. See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive, 2003 O.J. (L 275), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003L0087:EN:HTML [hereinafter Directive 2003/87/EC]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1; 37 I.L.M. 22 (Dec. 10, 1997), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 5. See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 24, 1994, 2303 U.N.T.S. 
148, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php. 
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countries—to reduce certain GHG emissions by 2012 to at least 5 percent 
below 1990 levels.6 The European Union pledged to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol to 8 percent below 1990 
levels in the period 2008 to 2012.7 
Because of the European Union’s emissions reduction pledge, the ETS is 
considered “a cornerstone of European policy on climate change”8 and is the 
world’s largest such scheme.9 The ETS did not initially include emissions from 
aviation activities; however the omission of aviation activities from the ETS 
eventually came to an end on January 1, 2012 when Directive 2008/101/EC, 
which amended Directive 2003/87/EC,10 entered into force.11.The extension of 
the ETS to aviation emissions requires aviation operators to surrender emission 
allowances equivalent to the total number of emissions produced the preceding 
year, and applies penalties to operators who do not comply with this 
obligation.12 Initially, 85 percent of emission allowances will be distributed 
freely with the remaining 15 percent auctioned, with a reserve fund of 
allowances being made available to new market entrants.13 
In addition to applying to European aviation companies, the ETS also 
applies to flights operated by aviation companies based outside of the European 
Union if those flights have arrive or depart at an aerodrome in the European 
Union.14 Critical of this aspect of the ETS, aviation operators based in 
countries, such as the United States, Canada, China, and Singapore argue, inter 
alia, that the ETS constitutes a tax on their airlines, is liable to penalize fast 
growing airlines, and adds significant costs to an industry already operating on 
small margins.15 
 
 6. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3. 
 7. See Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 2. 
 8. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 2011 E.C.R. 00000 (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CC0366&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre. 
 9. See Suzanne Kingston, Current Developments: European Union Law, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
1129, 1131 (2010), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online 
&aid=7923357. 
 10. See id.; see also Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 2. As a consequence of Article 1(4) of 
Directive 2008/101, Directive 2003/87/EC now contains a provision in Chapter II, Article 3a that states, 
“The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to the allocation and issue of allowances in respect of 
aviation activities listed in Annex I.” For the date of the entry into force of the amendment, see 
paragraph 2 of the introduction in Annex I of Directive 2003/87 (as amended) which states, “From 1 
January 2012 all flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated in the territory of a 
Member State to which the Treaty applies shall be included.” 
 11. See Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading within the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:008:0003:0021:en:PDF [hereinafter Directive 
2008/101/EC]. 
 12. See id. at arts. 12, 16. 
 13. See id. at art. 1, ¶¶ 8–9 (amending Directive 2003/87/EC arts. 3c-e). 
 14. See id. at 17, Annex 1. 
 15. See Damian Kahya, Air Wars: Fears of Trade War Over EU Airlines Carbon Cap, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 21, 2011, 7:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14325571; see also Jonathan Watts, 
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The criticism surrounding the actions of the European Union recently 
resulted in a legal challenge before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
on the validity of the extension of the ETS to include aviation.16 This challenge 
was brought by a number of airlines and associated organizations 
headquartered in the United States, including Air Transport Association of 
America, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, and United Airlines.17 This 
Article will explore the legal basis for the challenge to the European Union’s 
extension of its ETS to aviation emissions and review the Court of Justice’s 
consideration of the implicated issues, and will conclude with an evaluation of 
the likely next steps in this continuing dispute. 
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LEGAL CHALLENGE 
The airlines and associated organizations mentioned in the above 
paragraph commenced a judicial review of the challenged Directive before the 
High Court of Justice of England and Wales (English High Court)18 While the 
claimants challenged the measures taken by the United Kingdom to implement 
Directive 2008/101/EC,19 the more pertinent question of the validity of the 
directive itself was at the heart of the action. The claimants alleged that the 
extension of the ETS to encompass emissions from aviation breached several 
international agreements as well as a number of principles of customary 
international law.20 In this regard, the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (known as the Chicago Convention), the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
Open Skies Agreement were claimed to have been violated on the basis, inter 
alia, that the scheme imposes a tax on fuel consumption. The claimants also 
alleged that the application of the ETS to operators based outside of the 
European Union extends outside the territorial jurisdiction of the European 
Union, in breach of several principles of customary international law.21 
National courts of the E.U. Member States, as a general rule, do not have 
the power to declare an act of an E.U. institution invalid, since this task is 
 
Chinese Airlines Refuse to Pay EU Carbon Tax, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2012, 1:18 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/04/china-airlines-eu-carbon-tax; James Kanter, The 
Battle Over Aviation Emissions, The NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
12/19/business/energy-environment/the-battle-over-aviation-emissions.html?pagewanted=all. 
 16. See generally Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & 
Climate Change, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Dec. 21, 2011), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=117193&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=598262. 
 17. See id. ¶ 2. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. ¶¶ 2, 43; see also Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 11. See generally Regulations 
2010/1996 The Aviation Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme, available at http:// 
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/1996/made; The Defendant, United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change, was the department responsible for implementing the Directive. See Case 
C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶¶ 2, 43. 
 20. See Case C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶ 43. 
 21. See id. ¶¶ 108, 121. 
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specifically reserved to the E.U. courts.22 However, matters concerning the 
validity and interpretation of provisions of E.U. law may arise in the context of 
disputes heard at the national level. Accordingly, under Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a national court or 
tribunal of an E.U. Member State may seek what is referred to as a 
“preliminary ruling” from the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the 
constituent treaties or the “validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions . 
. .”23 In essence, under the TFEU Article 267 preliminary ruling procedure, a 
national court of an E.U. Member State may ask the Court of Justice to provide 
a ruling on a point of E.U. law. The national court will then utilize the Court of 
Justice’s ruling in deciding the dispute before it. 
In the specific case at issue, the English High Court sought a preliminary 
ruling from the Court of Justice on the validity of certain aspects of Directive 
2008/101/EC.24 This required the Court of Justice to consider a number of 
questions, the first of which was whether provisions of certain international 
agreements can be used to assess the validity of E.U. law.25 A related question 
asked by the English High Court was whether certain principles of customary 
international law could be utilized to review the validity of E.U. law.26 
Assuming an affirmative answer to these questions, the final task for the Court 
of Justice would be to consider whether the cited provisions and principles did, 
in fact, serve to affect the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC.27 
A. Can the Provisions of Certain International Agreements Be Used to 
Assess the Validity of International Law? 
The Court of Justice commenced its analysis by noting that, pursuant to 
TFEU Article 216(2),28 international agreements negotiated by the European 
Union are binding on the E.U. institutions and as such, will prevail over 
conflicting acts of the E.U. institutions.29 It therefore follows that, as a matter 
of law, the validity of acts of the E.U. institutions may be assessed for 
conformity with the provisions of international legal agreements provided that 
 
 22. See Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 419, ¶¶ 15–19, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61985CJ0314:EN:PDF. 
 23. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, 2010 
O.J. (C 83) 164, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010: 
083:0047: 0200:en:PDF. 
 24. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ¶¶ 3–4 (Oct 6, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CC0366&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre. 
 25. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Reference for a Preliminary Ruling From High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (July 
22, 2010), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=78971&mode= 
req&pageIndex =1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=598262. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See The Treaty on European Union art. 216(2), supra note 1. 
 29. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶ 50 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
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three conditions are fulfilled. First, the European Union must be bound by the 
rules in question;30 second, the “the nature and the broad logic” of the 
international agreement at issue must not preclude such an examination;31 and, 
finally, the provisions of the international agreement in question must be 
“unconditional and sufficiently precise.”32 This final criterion requires that the 
provision at issue contains a clear and precise obligation and prohibits any 
further measures from being taken to ensure its implementation.33 Having set 
out these criteria, the Court of Justice analyzed the provisions of the 
international agreements cited in the request for a preliminary ruling and 
considered whether they met the delineated criteria to act as benchmarks 
against which the validity of the contested Directive could be judged. 
1. The Chicago Convention 
The European Union is not a party to the Chicago Convention,34 although 
its Member States are signatories.35 While certain matters covered by the 
Convention have been legislated upon by the European Union,36 the Court of 
Justice found that the European Union does not yet have exclusive competence 
in all areas covered by the Convention.37 As such, the European Union is not 
bound by the Convention, and accordingly, the provisions of the Convention 
cannot be used as a benchmark upon which to judge the validity of E.U. law.38 
2. The Kyoto Protocol 
The European Union is a party to the Kyoto Protocol, and thus Kyoto is an 
integral part of the legal order of the European Union.39 However, the request 
for a preliminary ruling made specific reference to the validity of the Directive 
2008/101/EC in light of Article 2(2) of the Protocol, which provides that “The 
Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation . . . 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO].”40 The 
 
 30. See id. ¶ 52. 
 31. See id. ¶ 53. 
 32. See id. ¶ 54. 
 33. See id. ¶ 55. 
 34. See Convention on International Civil Aviation at the Chicago Convention, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295, available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf [hereinafter 
Chicago Convention]. 
 35. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶¶ 3, 60 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 36. See id. at ¶ 65. 
 37. See id. at ¶ 69. 
 38. See id. at ¶¶ 71–72. 
 39. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union at ¶ 73. 
 40. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2; see also Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. 
Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate Change, Reference for a Preliminary Ruling From High Court of 
Justice Queen’s Bench Division (July 22, 2010). 
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Court of Justice did not find this provision unconditional or sufficiently precise, 
as it merely exhorts parties to work through the ICAO to pursue reductions of 
emissions of certain GHGs from aviation bunker fuels. 41 There is thus no 
precise or specific individual “right” mentioned in Article 2(2) of the Protocol 
and, accordingly, individuals cannot rely upon it in legal proceedings to assess 
the validity of E.U. law.42 
3. Open Skies Agreement 
The European Union is a party to Open Skies,43 and the Court of Justice 
found nothing in the “broad logic” of the Agreement to preclude it from being 
used as a benchmark upon which to review the validity of Directive 
2008/101/EC.44 The next criterion the Court of Justice considered was whether 
the provisions of the Agreement cited in the English High Court’s request for a 
preliminary ruling were sufficiently precise and unconditional.45 The first 
provision considered by the Court of Justice was Article 7 of the Agreement. 
Article 7(1) of Open Skies specifically provides that: 
The laws and regulations of a Party relating to the admission to or 
departure from its territory of aircraft in international air navigation . . . 
shall be applied to the aircraft utilized by the airlines of other Party, and 
shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering and departing from or 
while within the territory of the first Party.46 
 The Court of Justice held that Article 7 of the Agreement “lays down a 
precise and specific obligation applying to aircraft utilized by the airlines of the 
parties to that agreement.”47 Accordingly, the Court of Justice found the 
provision in question to be sufficiently precise and unconditional.48 
Consequently, airlines could rely upon this provision could as a way to gain 
review the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC.49 
Linked to the above and underpinning the claimants’ assertions under 
Article 7 of Open Skies was their objection to the fact that the ETS applies “not 
only upon the entry of aircraft into the territory of the Member States or on 
their departure from that territory, but also to those parts of flights that are 
carried out above the high seas and the territory of third States.”50 In deciding 
 
 41. See Case C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶¶ 77–78. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Air Transport Agreement of April 2007 between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the United States of America, of the other part, April 2007, 2007 
O.J. (L 134) 4, available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm81/8137/8137.asp 
[hereinafter Open Skies Agreement]. 
 44. Case C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶¶ 80–85. 
 45. Id. ¶ 85. 
 46. Open Skies Agreement art. 7, supra note 43. 
 47. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶ 86 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 48. See id. ¶ 87. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. ¶ 131. 
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this issue, the Court of Justice held that aircraft registered in third States, and 
that fly over third States or over the high seas, are not subject to the ETS.51 
Instead, aircraft only become subject to the ETS if their operator makes the 
commercial decision that the flight in question departs from or arrives at an 
aerodrome situated in an E.U. Member State.52 Accordingly, there is nothing in 
the text of Article 7 of the Agreement to preclude the application of the ETS to 
flights that originate or arrive at E.U. aerodromes, and so the Court of Justice 
found no breach of Article 7.53 
Under the request for a preliminary ruling the Court of Justice also had to 
consider Article 11(1) and (2)(c) of the Agreement, which essentially provide 
an exemption—based on reciprocity—on charges, taxes, levies, and duties, and 
fees on lubricants, fuel, and consumable technical supplies for use in the 
aircraft of the other party.54 The Court of Justice held that these provisions 
were capable of being relied upon to assess the validity of Directive 
2008/101/EC.55 
The essence of the claimants’ statements in relation to Article 11(1) and 
(2)(c) of the Agreement was that Directive 2008/101/EC infringes the 
obligation of the European Union not to apply taxes and other charges on 
aircraft fuel.56 The Court of Justice commenced its examination by noting that, 
unlike a tax or charge that is intended to generate revenue for public 
authorities,57 the extension of the ETS to aviation emissions was designed to 
achieve an environmental objective.58 This distinctive feature, combined with 
the market-based operation of the ETS, meant that in the view of the Court of 
Justice, the ETS could not be regarded as imposing a tax or charge, and 
therefore, there was no violation of Article 11(1) or (2)(c) of the Agreement.59 
The final provisions of Open Skies considered by the Court of Justice 
were Articles 15(3), 2, and 3(4).60 The first sentence of Article 15(3) mandates 
that environmental standards adopted by the ICAO be followed “except where 
differences have been filed.”61 The second sentence of Article 15(3) provides 
that “The Parties shall apply any environmental measures affecting air services 
under this Agreement in accordance with Article 2 and Article 3(4) of this 
Agreement.”62 
 
 51. See id. ¶ 132. 
 52. See id. ¶ 133. 
 53. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶ 135 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 54. See Open Skies Agreement, supra note 43, art. 11(2)(c). 
 55. Case C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶ 94. 
 56. See id. ¶ 136. 
 57. See id. ¶ 143. 
 58. See id. ¶ 138. 
 59. See id. ¶ 147. 
 60. See id. ¶¶ 93–100. 
 61. Open Skies Agreement, supra note 43, art. 15(3). 
 62. Id. 
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The Court of Justice found that the first sentence of Article 15(3) 
constituted an obligation to follow ICAO environmental standards except 
where derogations had been filed. The content of this provision was held to be 
sufficiently precise and unconditional to permit it to be used as a benchmark 
upon which to review of the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC.63 The Court of 
Justice found the second sentence of Article 15(3), when read together with 
Article 2 and 3(4) of the Agreement, to impose an obligation upon the 
European Union, when enacting an environmental measure taking the form of 
an airport charge capable of limiting the volume, regularity or frequency of 
transatlantic air services, to ensure that any such charge on airlines from the 
United States should not be higher than that payable by airlines from an E.U. 
Member State.64 The essence of this obligation, in the view of the Court of 
Justice, was that the “European Union must allow a fair and equal opportunity 
for those two categories of airline to compete.”65 This provision was found to 
contain a sufficiently precise and unconditional obligation to be relied upon to 
review the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC. 
Having found that Article 15(3) of the Agreement could be used as a 
benchmark for reviewing the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC, the Court of 
Justice went on to summarize the main features of the claimants’ argument with 
respect to this provision: 
ATA [Air Transport Association of America] and others submit in essence 
that application of Directive 2003/87 to airlines established in the United 
States infringes Article 15(3) of the Open Skies Agreement, since such an 
environmental measure is incompatible with the relevant ICAO standards. 
Furthermore, in rendering the scheme laid down by Directive 2003/87 
applicable to aviation, Directive 2008/101 constitutes a measure limiting in 
particular the volume of traffic and frequency of service, in breach of 
Article 3(4) of that agreement. Finally, application of such a scheme 
amounts to a charge incompatible with Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention, a provision which the parties to the Open Skies Agreement 
undertook to comply with pursuant to Article 3(4) of that agreement.66 
In considering these claims, the Court of Justice noted that no evidence 
had been produced to justify the allegation that the extension of the ETS to 
include aviation violated any ICAO environmental standard within the meaning 
of Article 15(3) of the Agreement.67 Furthermore, the Court of Justice noted 
that there was nothing in the text of the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the 
Agreement, when read in conjunction with Article 3(4) of the same Agreement, 
to prevent measures being taken which may reduce the frequency of a service, 
provided that the measures were designed to meet an environmental goal.68 
 
 63. See Case C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶¶ 95–96. 
 64. See id. ¶ 99. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. ¶ 148. 
 67. See id. ¶ 149. 
 68. See id. ¶ 152. 
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Indeed, Article 3(4) expressly notes that limitations may not be applied “except 
as may be required for . . . environmental . . . reasons.”69 However, what is 
required by the second sentence of Article 15(3) of the Agreement, when read 
together with Articles 2 and 3(4) thereof, is that any such measure be applied in 
a non-discriminatory manner.70 The Court of Justice found this requirement to 
be satisfied as a consequence of the uniform application of the ETS to all 
airline operators that operate flights departing from or arriving at an aerodrome 
in an E.U. Member State.71 Accordingly, none of the agreements cited by the 
claimants called into question the validity of the contested Directive. 
B. Can Principles of Customary International Law Be Used to  
Assess the Validity of E.U. Law? 
In its request for a preliminary reference, the English High Court asked the 
Court of Justice whether the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC could be called 
into question by several principles of customary international law. The request 
addressed four specific principles of customary international law: (1) each State 
may exercise complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace; (2) no State 
may subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; (3) freedom to fly over 
the high seas should not be obstructed; and finally, (4) aircraft overflying the 
high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the country of registration, 
except as provided for by international treaty.72 The defendant rejected the 
existence of the final principle as being a principle of customary international 
law.73 
In approaching the question of whether the cited principles of customary 
law can be used to review the validity of Directive 2008/101/EC, the Court of 
Justice commenced its analysis by noting that pursuant to TFEU Article 3(5), 
the European Union must contribute to “the strict observance and the 
development of international law.”74 The practical import of this provision is 
that customary international law is binding upon the institutions of the 
European Union.75 
As such, the Court of Justice had to first establish whether the cited 
principles are recognized as customary international law.76 The Court answered 
this question in the affirmative with respect to the first three principles; 
however, regarding the fourth principle, that aircraft flying over the high seas 
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the country of registration, the Court 
 
 69. Id. ¶ 153. 
 70. Id. ¶ 154. 
 71. See id. ¶ 155. 
 72. See id. ¶ 45. 
 73. See id. ¶ 106. 
 74. The Treaty on European Union, supra note 1, art. 3(5). 
 75. See Case C-366/10, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ¶ 101. 
 76. See id. ¶ 102. 
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of Justice found insufficient evidence to establish the principle as customary 
international law.77 
While E.U. institutions are bound to act in accordance with customary 
international law principles, it does not automatically follow that individuals 
challenging the validity of acts of the E.U. institutions may rely upon these 
principles. Consequently, the Court of Justice had to assess whether the three 
accepted principles were “capable of calling into question the competence of 
the E.U. institutions to adopt the act” in question.78 Particularly, the Court of 
Justice had to address whether extension of the Directive required that it be 
“carried out in part over the high seas and over the third States’ territory.”79 
In essence, this question pertains to the territorial scope of the ETS and the 
related inquiry as to whether it applies extraterritorially, so as to impinge upon 
the sovereignty of other states, thereby violating customary international law.80 
The Court of Justice noted that, given the lack of precision of principles of 
customary international law, the applicable standard of review is whether, in 
adopting Directive 2008/101/EC, the E.U. institutions made “manifest errors of 
assessment concerning the conditions for applying those principles.”81 
The Court of Justice commenced its analysis by noting that aircraft 
operators will only be subject to the ETS if they have chosen to operate a route 
that departs from or arrives at an E.U. aerodrome.82 Thus, the European Union 
is entitled to apply the ETS to such aircraft on the basis of the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction, and accordingly, there can be no impingement upon 
the sovereignty of other states or breach of customary international law.83 
Given that there is no violation of customary international law, the application 
of the ETS “to all flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated 
in the territory of a Member State” cannot be called into question on the 
grounds that the E.U. institutions lacked competence to enact such 
legislation.84 Accordingly, the Court of Justice “concluded that examination of 
Directive 2008/101 has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect its 
validity.”85 Accordingly, neither the international agreements nor the principles 
of customary international law cited in the application for judicial review 
before the English High Court called into question the validity of the contested 
Directive. 
 
 77. See id. ¶ 106. 
 78. Id. ¶ 107. 
 79. Id. ¶ 108. 
 80. See id. ¶ 121. 
 81. Id. ¶ 110. 
 82. See id. ¶ 127. 
 83. See id. ¶¶ 124–25. 
 84. See id. ¶ 130. 
 85. Id. ¶ 157. 
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II. LOOKING FORWARD 
Given the findings of the Court of Justice, the U.S. airline industry will 
likely consider alternative legal routes to challenge the extension of the ETS to 
include aviation emissions.86 The present action before the English High Court 
is an “indirect” challenge to the terms of the aviation scheme. A “direct” 
challenge to the legality of E.U. legislation is permissible pursuant to TFEU 
Article 263, which provides that, “The Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall review the legality of legislative acts . . .”87 The rules for standing under 
this provision, however, are extremely restrictive for natural and legal 
persons.88 In the type of action at issue, the parties will generally have to show 
“direct and individual” concern in the measure in order to satisfy the standing 
requirement.89 The other criterion upon which a natural or legal person may 
establish locus standi under Article 263 (4) TFEU is where the act in question 
is, “a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures.”90 The requirement of individual concern is 
particularly troublesome for applicants who must demonstrate that an act of the 
E.U. institutions “affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar 
to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all 
other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually.”91 
With such strict requirements, it is unlikely that even E.U. based applicants 
would be assessed to have attributes “peculiar to them.” This was undoubtedly 
their rationale to pursue an “indirect challenge” via national courts.92 
Another alternative legal avenue to challenge the ETS’ inclusion of 
aviation emissions would be for the United States to initiate a dispute before 
the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention.93 While the 
dispute settlement facility of the ICAO has been seldom used, there is 
precedent for such an action, as the United States previously brought a 
 
 86. Kanter, supra note 15. 
 87. The Treaty on European Union, supra note 1, art. 263. 
 88. See id. 
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Court, 1963 E.C.R. 95 (July 15, 1963), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=CELEX:61962J0025:EN:HTML. 
 92. See Steven Truxel, At the Sidelines of Implementing the EU ETS: Objections to "Validity" 
16(4) INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 111, 115–18 (2010). 
 93. See Chicago Convention, supra note 34, art. 84 (“If any disagreement between two or more 
contracting States relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot 
be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be 
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dispute to which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision 
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complaint before the ICAO Council regarding a European regulation on aircraft 
noise.94 
In the meantime, political events may overtake the judicial process. The 
U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, to “prohibit operators of civil aircraft 
of the United States from participating in the European Union’s emissions 
trading scheme . . . .”95 While the U.S. Senate has not yet passed this bill, 
commentators have warned that any “blocking statute” could provoke a 
transatlantic trade war.96 In a similar regard, the deputy secretary general of 
China’s leading civil aviation organization has also stated that the airlines 
represented by his organization will not cooperate with the ETS, marking a 
burgeoning dispute between the European Union and aviation bodies from 
around the world.97 
The European Union has taken great pains to highlight that it considers the 
extension of its ETS to include aviation emissions an important and necessary 
element of the region’s efforts to curb the threat of climate change.98 The E.U. 
Commissioner for Climate Change, in response to the judgment of the Court of 
Justice discussed in this Article, stated that, “We reaffirm our wish to engage 
constructively with everyone during the implementation of our legislation.”99 
The first charges associated with the ETS are not set to be levied until the 
summer of 2013. Only time will tell if the parties involved use the remaining 
time for “constructive” engagement. 
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